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THE PORTFOLIO OF POLITICAL TIES AND MARKET ENTRIES OF 
BUSINESS GROUPS IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines how political ties maintained by a firm with rival political parties 
affect the firm’s entry into new industries. Drawing on the social network research, resource 
dependence theory, and corporate political strategy literature, we argue that the impact of a 
firm’s portfolio of political ties on market entry depends on the distribution of political power 
among rival political parties and the concomitant interdependency between the focal firm and 
its political partners. A diverse portfolio of political ties may facilitate entries when the 
political parties are relatively evenly matched in political power, but may induce adverse 
effects when there is substantial power distance between political parties. Moreover, the 
impact of portfolios of political ties on market entry is contingent on the internal resources of 
politically connected firms. Using the context of political ties maintained by Taiwanese 
business groups from 1998-2004, we find strong support for the proposed effects. The 
findings have implications for research on the corporate political strategy, contingencies of 
social relationships, the expansion of multi-business firms, and the organization of 
government. 
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Recent studies have indicated that political actions of the firm is an important 
component of the overall strategy formulation and has substantial impact on firms’ behavior 
and performance in developed as well as emerging economies (Baron, 1995; Hillman, 
Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999). However, the existing corporate political strategy literature 
primarily focuses on business-government (administration) interactions, and relatively less 
attention has been paid to another important power segment—the political parties. Although 
some research has indicated that firms often adopt various political tactics, such as campaign 
contributions and constituency building, to support their favored political parties (Epstein, 
1984; Keim and Zeithaml, 1986; Zeithaml, Keim, and Baysinger, 1988), we know little about 
how firms decide to target their political tactics at which political parties to achieve desirable 
goals. To the extent that political parties play an important role in the landscape of political 
power by setting policy agendas, nominating candidates for officials and legislators, 
monitoring the work of elected representatives, and controlling government institutions and 
policies if they win the elections (Schlesinger, 1991), the overlook of interface between 
business and political parties makes our understanding of the political strategies of firms 
incomplete1
Given the limited resources of firms, it is important to understand how firms can 
maximize the value received from interactions with political parties by targeting the right 
. Moreover, since party competition holds important implications for the 
organization of governments which substantially affects the policy making processes and 
results through interactions between executive and legislative branches (March and Olsen, 
1989; Scott, 2001), scholarly understanding of the efficacy of firms’ political strategies 
targeting the government will be further improved when the relationships between firms and 
political parties are taken into consideration. 
                                                 
1 A few studies included a firm’s ties to political parties in its pool of political ties (e.g. Faccio, 2006; Johnson and Mitton, 
2003), but they did not differentiate ties to political parties from other types of political ties (e.g. ties to government officials 
and legislators) and thus provided limited insight about how the interplay between firms and political parties influences 
political strategies of firms.   
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political parties at the right time. This study seeks to address this agenda by examining how a 
firm’s portfolio of political ties to different political parties affect firm’s diversification 
strategy such as entries into unrelated industries. Specifically, we investigate how the rivalry 
between political parties, as seen in many political systems (Huntington, 1968; Pasuk and 
Baker, 1995; Wad, 2002), affect the behavior and outcome of politically connected firms. We 
also explore the configuration of optimal portfolios of political ties that promote the 
expansion of business scope by politically connected firms. Integrating the insights from 
research on portfolios of network ties, resource dependence theory, and corporate political 
strategy literature, we argue and show that when political power is evenly distributed among 
political parties as a result of party competition, a diverse portfolio of political ties facilitate 
market entry. However, when there is substantial power distance (or popularity in terms of 
vote) between political parties, a diverse portfolio can inhibit entry into new markets. In 
addition, the effectiveness of political ties is contingent on the characteristics of the focal firm 
such as firm resources. The internal resources of the firm weaken the relationships between 
political ties and market entries. 
A political tie here refers to a personal relationship between a business executive and 
a party leader. A portfolio of political ties hence is a collection of political ties between the 
focal firm and different (and even opposing) political parties. Borrowing from the network 
literature the concept of egocentric network, which encompasses the focal firm (ego), its set 
of partners (alters), and their connecting ties (Wasserman and Faust, 1994), we call this 
egocentric portfolio of political ties. We choose to focus on the portfolio of political ties 
rather than single, independent dyadic ties for two reasons. First, the composition of portfolio 
reflects how the focal firm targets its political tactics at political parties. Specifically, a 
diverse portfolio composed of ties with different political parties implies that the focal firm 
targets multiple political parties, while a homogeneous portfolio suggest that the focal firm 
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concentrates its political tactics on a single or a few political parties. Despite the widespread 
belief that political ties are an important channel for the interaction between business and 
polity (e.g. Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman, 1999; Peng and Luo, 2000; Siegel, 2007; Xin 
and Pearce, 1996), the political tie literature has largely focused on the impact of individual 
dyadic ties and regarded each political tie as an isolate conduit rather than an interdependent 
component in a portfolio of ties. The current literature has achieved limited success in 
explaining how political ties maintained by a firm as a collectivity may shape the firm’s 
strategy and profitability.  
In regard to the network literature, the value of portfolio of ties is mainly conducted in 
the context of alliance network where firms share common goals and create value through 
resource sharing and co-development of products, services, or technologies (Gulati, 1998). 
This line of research suggests that the value created by the focal firm from network ties 
depends not only on individual ties, but also on the portfolio of ties as a whole due to the 
interdependencies between ties (Bae and Gargiulo, 2004; Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 
2000; Lavie, 2007). Investigating portfolios of political ties thus enables us to fully account 
for the impact of political ties on firm’s new market entry. Moreover, due to the unique 
nature of portfolios of political ties, this study also enriches the network literature by 
examining outcomes of portfolios of ties which involve competition between alters of the 
focal firm and punitive actions taken by alters on the focal firm. 
We situate the theoretical arguments using business groups in emerging economies. 
Business groups are sets of legally-independent firms, operating in multiple industries which 
are under a common administrative and financial control through various formal and informal 
relationships within groups (Chang and Hong, 2000; Granovetter, 1995; Khanna and Rivkin, 
2001). Business groups are ubiquitous in virtually all emerging economies, producing a 
significant portion of the national GDP and hiring a substantial number of employees 
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(Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). Business groups suit this study for 
several reasons. First, entry into new industries has been a major response of business groups 
in emerging economies to market-oriented transitions sweeping these countries since the 
1980s (Hoskisson, et al., 2004). Groups usually diversify into unrelated industries by taking 
advantage of their superior ability to set up and manage projects in diverse industries 
(Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Kock and Guillen, 2001).  Moreover, business groups often 
maintain extensive political ties to political parties in their countries (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Group leaders and political actors interact with each other 
intensively for exchange of information and resources. In addition, after the “third wave” of 
political democratization in many emerging economies, the establishment of new political 
parties is allowed, leading to intense party competition and even rivalries (Huntington, 1991; 
Sachs and Warner, 1995).   
We use the 250 largest Taiwanese business groups (1998-2004) as the empirical setting 
for four reasons. First, Taiwanese business groups have undertaken extensive entry activities 
since the economic liberalization of Taiwan in the late-1980s (Chung and Mahmood, 2006). 
Second, embedded in a relationship-based society, leaders of Taiwanese business groups 
keep extensive personal relationships with party leaders. Third, with the establishment and 
growth of new political parties since 1986, the dominant role of the Nationalist Party, the 
KMT, in the politics of Taiwan has been challenged. The competition among political parties 
in the presidency and legislative campaign was intense during 1998-2004. Finally, the clear-
defined group boundaries of Taiwanese business groups enable us to accurately track the 
entry activities of group affiliates and political ties maintained by group leaders (Luo and 
Chung, 2005).  
This study makes three major contributions to the existing literature. First, it contributes 
to the corporate political strategy literature by examining the political portfolio that firms can 
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adopt to shape the political environment when facing rivalry between political parties. 
Specifically, we identify the conditions under which firms should (or should not) develop a 
diverse portfolio of political ties. We hence establish the direct and contingent conditions 
under which political ties facilitate or hinder the entry of business groups into new industries. 
Second, it contributes to social network research by exploring the optimal portfolio of 
network ties by considering how the rivalry among network alters and the interdependencies 
between the focal firm and alters affect the strategy of focal firms in the context of political 
networks. It shows that the desirable properties of portfolios of network ties depend on the 
nature of relationships among network partners. Further, this study broadens the market entry 
literature by highlighting the contingent value of political ties and showing how the political 
capital and internal resources possessed by a firm jointly affect its market entry. By adopting 
a holistic approach, we are better able to see the hitherto unobserved connections between the 
market entry literature and corporate political strategy research.  This study also provides 
supportive empirical evidence to the theoretical argument that the capability of business 
groups to exploit their political capital in emerging economies facilitates their expansion into 
unrelated industries (Kock and Guillen, 2001).  
 
RIVAL POLITICAL PARTIES, THE PORTFOLIO OF POLITICAL TIES, AND 
MARKET ENTRIES 
Current alliance research shows that impacts of alliance portfolio on the focal firm 
depend on the attributes of partner firms, the nature of relationships between the focal firm 
and its partners, and the relationships among its partners (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 
2000; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Lavie, 2007). This line of literature suggests that the 
focal firm benefits from an alliance portfolio composed of prominent partners (Stuart, 2000; 
Zaheer and Bell, 2005), partners with heterogeneous resource profile (Burt, 1992; Hargadon 
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and Sutton, 1997; Rodan and Galumi, 2004), partners which are not competitors of the focal 
firm (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; Lavie, 2006), and partners competing with each 
other (Lavie, 2007).  
Building upon these insights, we further develop a theoretical framework of the 
efficacy of portfolios of political ties by taking into account the prominence of connected 
political parties, the nature of relationships between the focal firm and connected political 
parties, as well as among political parties in its portfolio. It intends to provide insights into 
the design of portfolios of political ties.  
Party competition and distribution of political power 
The political science literature defines a political party as a team “seeking to control 
the governing apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election” (Downs, 1957). In 
many political systems, we see two or more political parties compete for the control of 
government institutions. In democratic contexts, the competition is carried out through 
periodic general elections. The party (or coalition of parties) winning the majority of votes 
gains control of the government institutions until next election. However, in democratic 
nations with distinct electoral systems, the relationship between the executive branch and 
legislative branch is different, and thus the distribution of political power between parties 
controlling certain government institutions vary across nations2
 Presidential elections and legislative elections are the major battlefields of party 
competition (Hungtington, 1968). When it wins the majority votes in the presidential election, 
a political party or coalition gains executive authority and becomes the ruling party. When it 
. The following discussion 
about party competition uses presidential systems as the institutional context.  
                                                 
2 For instance, in parliamentary countries, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, the executive branch is typically a 
constituent part of the legislative branch (Moe and Caldwell, 1994). The majority party which wins in the legislative election 
controls both the executive and legislative branches. In presidential countries, such as the United States, however, there is a 
significant separation of political power between the executive branch and the legislative branch (Hillman and Keim, 1995). 
Political control of the legislature does not guarantee a party control of the executive branch since the chief executive is 
elected separately and may be from another party. To the extent that the political power is more concentrated in 
parliamentary systems than in presidential systems (Hillman and Keim, 1995), the theoretical framework developed in this 
study which focuses on the strategic interaction of firms and rival political parties closely applies to firms operating in 
countries with presidential systems. 
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wins the majority seats in the legislative election, a political party or coalition achieves 
legislative authority. If a political party controls both legislative and executive authority, it 
dominates domestic politics and has a mandate to political power. The government is thus 
under unified party control which often leads to cooperation between the president and his 
colleagues in the legislative branch (Sundquist, 1988; Cox and Kernell, 1992). If different 
parties control the legislature and executive branches, the political power is relatively evenly 
distributed among the ruling party (executive) and the opposition party (legislature). The 
government under divided party control is referred to as a divided government (Cox and 
Kernell, 1992). As a result, there may be less opportunity for the majority party or coalition 
in the legislature to control policy making and the legislative agenda (Alt and Lowry, 1994). 
In United States, for example, the result of competition between the Democratic and the 
Republican parties in presidential elections and congressional elections determines 
presidential-congressional relations (Oleszek, 1984).  
The distribution of political power determines the prominence of political parties or 
coalitions as alters in a focal firm’s political networks. In a unified government, the ruling 
party which controls both legislative and executive branches is the most prominent partner 
for the focal firm as it shapes the competitive environment faced by the firm through enacting 
policies, and monitoring regulatory agencies, bureaus, and judiciary (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; 
Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2008; Keim and Zeithaml, 1986; Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer, 
2002). In contrast, the opposition parties without control over the legislative branch are the 
least attractive alters as they are not able to exert significant influence on public policies and 
implementation. Comparatively, in a divided government, the ruling party with executive 
authority and the opposition party with legislative authority are moderately prominent alters 
because they are able to influence policymaking and implementation to certain extent. 
Opposition parties without any political power are least prominent alters. Furthermore, the 
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distribution of political power among parties in the focal firm’s political networks also 
influences the relative bargaining power of the focal firm and thus the outcomes of its 
portfolio of political ties.  
Bargaining power and efficacy of portfolios of political ties on market entry 
Studies on interfirm network suggest that being connected to diverse alters benefits 
the focal firm by providing heterogeneous information and resources, thus enabling the firm 
to achieve desirable goals such as improved performance, successful implementation of 
strategies, and higher growth rate (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002; Burt, 2000; Powell, 
Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996; Reagans and Zuckerman, 2001). In the context of political 
networks, however, maintaining political ties with multiple political parties may not be 
always beneficial primarily because powerful political parties have punitive power over the 
focal firm and are able to levy retaliation costs, which are the additional costs beyond 
withdrawing some existing benefits supplied to the focal firm (Lawler and Bacharach, 1987). 
A firm having political affinities with opposition parties often becomes the target of 
retribution by the ruling party (Siegel, 2007). In addition, the prominence of connected 
political parties may change dramatically as a result of general elections or forced regime 
changes (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006).  
We argue that the benefits and costs derived from a diverse portfolio of political ties 
hence hinge upon the focal firm’s relative bargaining power vis-à-vis political parties in its 
portfolio, which determines the extent to which it can refrain from retribution by powerful 
parties and the value it can receive from political ties. Through political ties, the focal firm 
exchanges votes, campaign contributions, and policy support for information, resources, and 
administrative privileges with political parties3
                                                 
3 Political ties originating from a common political ideology do not necessarily involve exchanges between the focal firm and its 
political partners, and thus the bargaining between them. However, this type of political ties may indirectly affect market entry by 
inducing retribution by powerful parties embracing ideologies different from that of the focal firm, or by influencing the bargaining 
power of the focal firm relative to other political parties. We discuss the impact of this type of political ties in detail when 
developing Hypothesis 3, Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 4b.  
. (Baron, 1995; Benson, 1975; Hillman and 
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Hitt, 1999; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). Bargaining power refers to the ability to favorably 
change the terms of agreements, to obtain accommodations from partners, and to influence 
the outcomes of negotiations (Schelling, 1956; Yan and Gray, 1994). When the focal firm is 
in a stronger bargaining position, the cost of taking punitive actions by powerful political 
parties is high because the focal firm may consequently come up with unfavorable 
agreements to political parties which may lead to their failure in political elections. Hence, 
powerful political parties are unlikely to employ their punitive capability. Moreover, the focal 
firm is more likely to gain desirable outcomes from negotiations with political parties by 
taking advantage of its strong bargaining power. When the focal firm has relatively weak 
bargaining power, however, powerful political parties may use punitive tactics without 
bearing much cost because the focal firm is unlikely to withdraw the existing benefits 
supplied to political parties given its high dependence on them. At the same time, the benefits 
the focal firm can explore from political ties with congenial parties are likely to decrease 
given its inferior position in negotiations.  
Resource dependence theory indicates that bargaining power derives from the 
interdependence between the focal firm and its partners (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The 
bargaining power of the focal firm in a bargaining relationship depends on two dimensions of 
interdependence: (1) the stake it has in the exchange; (2) the availability of alternatives 
(Bacharach and Lawler, 1984). The lower the stake in a relationship and the more alternatives 
the firm has, the more bargaining power the firm has over its partners in the relationships. 
In the context of political networks, the bargaining power of the focal firm derives 
from its stakes in the political ties, and the availability of alternative political ties. As 
indicated in Figure 1, the bargaining power of the focal firm relative to both the ruling party 
and the opposition party is likely become stronger when the distribution of political power 
gets dispersed. First, when the ruling party and the opposition party are equally powerful, the 
 12 
stakes of political parties increase as the competition between them for electoral campaigns 
contributions and votes intensifies. Each party engages in gaining support from connected 
firms, which is more critical for them to succeed in the intense party competition. Without the 
support from the business, political parties would be in inferior positions and may not be able 
to win elections. As a result, political parties become more dependent on their business 
partners, leading to their weaker bargaining position relative to the focal firm. In fact, it is 
found that under this situation, political parties are more willing to satisfy the demands of the 
focal firm so as to obtain its support which is critical to their winning in the election (Baron, 
2001). In contrast, when the ruling party dominates political power, the stakes of political 
parties get lower primarily due to the fact that political parties are likely to request for fewer 
electoral resources from connected firms considering the great disparity in strength between 
the ruling party and the opposition party. To the extent that the superior access to information, 
resources, and favorable policies provided by political parties is always beneficial to the focal 
firm, the stake of the focal firm remain unchanged no matter how political power is 
distributed. Hence, the focal firm enjoys more bargaining power on the dimension of stakes 
in the political ties when political power is evenly distributed.  
Second, when political power is distributed dispersedly, each party is able to provide 
some desirable resources, information, and public policies with the focal firm in exchange for 
its support. The focal firm enjoys more alternative political parties to pursue similar 
objectives. For instance, when the ruling party dominates politics, the focal firm may be 
forced to accept requests made by the ruling party if it wants to gain favorable policies. In 
contrast, when the opposition party controls the legislative branch, leaving only executive 
branch to the ruling party, the focal firm can resort to the opposition party to pursue similar or 
substitutable policies if the requirements put forwarded by the ruling party are not acceptable. 
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The availability of more alternatives reduces the dependence of the focal firm on connected 
political parties and thus endows more bargaining power to the focal firm.  
Based on the foregoing discussion, we may draw the conclusion that, when the 
distribution of political power gets dispersed, the focal firm is likely to gain more bargaining 
power while the political parties tend to enjoy less bargaining power. Consequently, the focal 
firm will be in a stronger bargaining position relative to its political partners in negotiations. 
We briefly summarize how the bargaining power of each party in the political network 
changes in response to different distributions of political power in Table 1. 
********** Insert Table 1 about here ********** 
Portfolios of political ties maintained by firms have important implications for their 
market entries. They may facilitate entries into new markets by providing access to valuable 
information and resources not available through the arm-length relationships (e.g. trends of 
industrial policies), and favorable policies and treatments (e.g. entry permits to regulated 
industries) with firms. However, they may also deter market entries when firms become 
victims of political struggles between political parties. Hence, to maximize the benefits drawn 
from portfolios of political ties while refraining themselves from retaliations imposed by 
powerful political parties, firms need to get connected to prominent parties, and leverage their 
bargaining power to derive desirable resources from them and at the same time to inhibit 
punitive tactics taken by political parties.  
In summary, our framework suggests that the value of portfolios of political ties 
derived by firms depends on the distribution of political power among political parties in the 
portfolios, which consequently determines the prominence of political parties and the 
interdependencies between firms and their political partners. Firms need to construct and 
adjust the configuration of portfolios of political ties in response to the changing political 
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environment so as to enter into new markets. Figure 1 depicts our conceptual framework of 
how portfolios of political ties affect market entries by politically connected firms.  
********** Insert Figure 1 about here ********** 
The intense party competition and the concomitant changes in distribution of political 
power around 2000 in Taiwan provides a rare setting near natural experiment for us to 
examine the validity of our theoretical framework.  
 
PARTY COMPETITION IN TAIWAN FROM 1998-2004 
The KMT Nationalist Party dominated Taiwan’s politics and economy from its retreat 
from Mainland China in 1949 until 1987 (Gold, 1985; Wade, 1990), when the greatest wave 
of political democratization in Taiwan’s modern history took place (Tien, 1989). Martial law 
was lifted in 1987 and new political parties, labor protests and private mass media were 
allowed. The establishment of the major opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP) intensified the competition in political elections. Losing the monopolistic status in 
politics and facing severe challenges from DPP, KMT started seeking campaign contributions 
and votes from business groups. The relationship between business groups and KMT had 
turned from top-down to a more balanced strategic partnership. Before 2000, KMT had been 
the ruling party of Taiwan. It also controlled the Legislative Yuan, the Taiwanese equivalent 
of Congress, government agencies, and judiciary by assigning a large number of its party 
members to key positions.    
In the election for the 10th-term President of the Republic of China, Chen Shui-Bian 
from the DPP was elected president, putting an end to more than half a century of KMT rule 
in Taiwan. Chen Shui-Bian was re-elected in the 2004 presidential election. Since Taiwan 
adopts the presidential system, DPP’s success in presidential election did not guarantee its 
control of the Legislative Yuan. It turned out that KMT still possessed a majority of the seats 
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in the Legislative Yuan after DPP came into administrative power. The separation of 
legislative and executive authority in Taiwan induced intense competition and conflicts 
between KMT and DPP.   
Table 2A and Table 2B show the changes in distribution of political power among 
major political parties in Taiwan from 1998 to 2004. Table 2A is about the party competition 
in presidential elections. It shows that DPP won the presidency in both 2000 and 2004. With 
regard to the legislative election, DPP won fewer seats than KMT in three consecutive 
elections took place in 1998 (31% vs. 55%), 2001 (39% vs. 51%), and 2004 (40% vs. 50%) 
respectively. 
********** Insert Table 2A and Table 2B about here ********** 
In summary, the political power in Taiwan was dominated by KMT before 2000, 
making opposition parties powerless and the power distribution highly uneven. This situation 
changed dramatically since DPP came into power in 2000. Political power was dispersed with 
DPP controlling the executive and KMT governing the legislative until 2008 when KMT 
again controlled both the administrative agencies and the legislative arm.  
 
HYPOTHESES 
Political ties and entry into new industries 
 Recent research indicates that being tied to powerful politicians greatly enhances the 
effectiveness of a firm’s non-market strategy such as lobbying and campaign contribution 
(Bonardi, Holburn, and Bergh, 2006). We argue that due to ruling party’s control of executive 
authority, political ties to leaders of the ruling party can facilitate firms’ entry into new 
industries by providing three substantive benefits. 
First, political ties to the ruling party enable firms to enjoy information advantage and 
acquire resources that are under ruling party’s control. The information transferred through 
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political ties keeps firms updated about the changes in economic policies and regulations and 
helps them foresee changes in the policy environment (Schuler, Rehbein, and Cramer, 2002). 
Such information is particularly valuable in emerging economies where information 
asymmetry is prevalent (Khanna and Palepu, 1997), and policies and regulations change 
constantly (Keister, 1998; Khanna and Palepu, 1999). Moreover, when the ruling party has 
discretion over how policies and regulations are interpreted and implemented based on its 
political ideology (Kalt and Zupan, 1984) and the preferences of relevant voter constituents 
that affect its electoral success (Vanden Bergh and de Figueiredo, 2003), the information 
obtained from political ties with the ruling party is richer and more accurate than that 
acquired from other sources (Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Potter, 2002; Li and Zhang, 2007). The 
information advantage help politically connected firms envisage future directions of 
economic growth (Chu, 1994), detect industrial policies in advance (Fields, 1997) and 
identify novel market opportunities (Luo, 2003). Ties to the ruling party may also provide 
groups with access to resources that are crucial to their expansion into new industries. For 
example, when the banking sector of Taiwan opened up for private firms in early 1990’s, the 
Ministry of Finance set the minimum capital requirement for the establishment of a new bank 
at NT$10 billion (equivalent to US$375 million). Consequently, all the 15 newly-established 
banks in 1991 were backed by large business groups, 79% of which were politically 
connected to KMT, which provided financial support with the business groups through state 
banks (Chu and Hung, 2002; Chung, 2004).  
Second, firms tied to the ruling party may have superior access to licenses, permits, 
administrative privileges, privileged regulatory treatments, and favors, which makes their 
market entry easier. Ruling party members often use their power in public policy making to 
steer preferential treatments toward firms with which they have political ties. For example, in 
our research context, KMT bureaucrats favored 6 telecommunication firms co-invested by 20 
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largest business groups in their bid to acquire 8 wireless telecommunication licenses in 1997 
because of their social ties with the top management teams of these firms (Wealth Magazine, 
1998). In Columbia, political ties were found critical for businesses to obtain contracts and 
licenses, which in turn provide firms with opportunities to enter new markets (Rettberg, 
2001). Kock and Guillen (2001) suggest that “contact capability”, which is the ability of 
firms to link to domestic regulators for resources and permits, as well as to foreign providers 
of technology and markets, enables business groups to expand into unrelated industries.   
Third, political ties to the ruling party promote the legitimacy of firms. Institutional 
theorists have found that when a firm develops ties to organizations with high legitimacy, it 
obtains enhanced legitimacy and status because the ties imply its conformance to taken-for-
granted institutional prescriptions (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott 
and Meyer, 1983; Oliver, 1991). The enhanced legitimacy in turn facilitates the firm in its 
attempts to acquire important resources for survival and effectiveness (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Rao, 1994). For example, Peng and his colleagues (2005) 
argued that network ties to dominant institutions confer useful resources and legitimacy that 
are critical to business group diversification. Baum and Oliver (1991) demonstrated that firms 
with linkages to government agencies and regulatory commissions had a survival advantage 
conferred by its increased legitimacy and enhanced ability to acquire resources. Since the 
ruling party is an organization with high legitimacy in the fields of business and economic 
matters, business groups tied to the ruling party are likely to enjoy increased legitimacy, 
which facilitates resource acquisition and confirms its rights and competence to provide new 
products and services.  
When the ruling party simultaneously controls the executive and legislative branch, 
political ties with the ruling party are even more beneficial. Taking advantage of its 
overwhelming political power, the ruling party is able to provide a larger pool of resources 
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and information that connected business groups can tap on. Without disturbance from 
opposition parties in the legislation process, the ruling party is more able to endow favorable 
treatments and privileges to connected business groups by proposing and passing laws, rules, 
and regulations. In addition, the legitimacy of the ruling party is likely to be higher when it 
has both executive and legislative authority. Business groups connected to the ruling party 
hence enjoy higher legitimacy and thus an extra boost to their market entries. Therefore, we 
propose that: 
Hypothesis 1: The more political ties to the ruling political party, the more entries 
into unrelated industries by business groups in emerging economies.  
Political ties with the opposition party which has legislative authority are also 
conducive to market entries by firms. Legislators affiliated to the opposition party may offer 
bills favorable to the connected firms (Shaffer, 1995). They may also modify existing rules 
and regulations to improve the competitive position of connected firms by disproportionately 
raising the costs of their rivals, lower or get rid of entry barriers to connected firms, and 
indirectly steer resources in the direction of connected firms through regulations on banks 
and other institutions (Frynas, Mellahi, and Pigman, 2006; Siegel, 2004). Entry into the 
petroleum industry of Taiwan by Ho Tung Group in 2001 demonstrates the benefits of such 
political ties. Before 2001, the petroleum industry was monopolized by two large 
petrochemical corporations due to their ability to meet the requirement of daily oil-refining 
volume specified in the Petroleum Management Law. To get into this profitable industry, a 
small-scale chemical business group, Ho Tung, utilized its political ties with KMT legislators 
to reduce the required daily oil-refining volume and successfully entered into this industry 
(Wealth Magazine, 2001). In addition to taking advantage of the power of the opposition 
party over legislation, connect firms are also likely to enjoy enhanced legitimacy to the extent 
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that the dominant party at the legislature is regarded as a highly legitimate organization. We 
thus hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2: The more political ties to the opposition party with legislative authority, 
the more entries into unrelated industries by business groups in emerging economies. 
In contrast, being connected to an opposition party which has little political power 
may impede the expansion of business groups into unrelated industries. Opposition parties 
which do not have control of the legislature are unable to provide business groups with 
resources and information that facilitate entries into new markets because they do not have 
the power to set laws and regulations, to influence public policy making through passage or 
veto of statutes, and to steer resources in the direction to connected business groups.  
Instead, being tied to powerless opposition parties may induce discrimination and 
retribution by the ruling party, leading the connected groups to be victims of political rivalry. 
From the perspective of the ruling party, groups connected to opposition parties are 
discontent or even objective to its rule.  To reinforce its governance, the ruling party often 
takes retaliatory actions to undermine the growth of business groups connected to opposition 
parties. Empirical studies show that firms connected to political enemies of those in power 
are less able to form cross-border strategic alliances with foreign firms which possess 
advanced technological and managerial know-how because of the resource exclusion and 
discrimination imposed by politicians in power (Siegel, 2007). The Chi-Mei Group in Taiwan 
is a well-know adherent to DPP since KMT dominated the politics of Taiwan in 1949. In the 
early stage of its development, Chi-Mei Group suffered from the short of capital because the 
state banks controlled by KMT either rarely provided bank credits to it or offered loans on 
unfavorable terms (Ju, 2003). 
Moreover, the legitimacy of business groups may be damaged if they are connected to 
opposition parties without political power because such parties suffer from lower level of 
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political popularity. The impaired legitimacy of connected groups is likely to hurt their ability 
to maintain steady resource flows from external environment (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; 
Cattani, Ferriani, Negro, and Perretti, 2008). It is difficult for them to exploit the “contact 
capability” of combining the local market and supply of resources with foreign technology in 
new industries (Kock and Guillen, 2001). In line with this discussion, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: The more political ties to the opposition political party without 
political power, the fewer entries into unrelated industries by business groups in 
emerging economies.  
Diversity of portfolios of political ties and entry into unrelated industries 
 A diverse portfolio of political ties induces both benefits and costs to business groups’ 
entry into unrelated industries. Business groups may benefit from ties to multiple political 
parties by having access to diverse resource pools and information that are applicable to a 
number of unrelated industries. Moreover, a diverse portfolio of political ties protects the 
group from political risk resulting from unexpected regime changes. When business leaders 
befriend politicians of different parties, the connected group is less likely to be negatively 
targeted by the new ruling party, whose key members have social ties with the group. As such, 
the connected group is able to maintain a relatively stable flow of benefits derived from its 
portfolio of political ties regardless of the outcomes of party competition. Diverse political 
ties enhance the political flexibility of the focal group.  
A case in point is Formosa Plastic, one of Taiwan’s largest business groups. It used to 
keep connections with KMT, but it gradually diversified its political ties by befriending DPP 
leaders with the rise of DPP. Wang Yung-Ching, the founder of Formosa Plastic, often 
accepted dinner invitations from the Chairman of DPP, Chen Shui-Bian when KMT was still 
in power (Wealth Magazine, 2002). After DPP came into power in 2000, Formosa Plastic 
continued to operate smoothly, successfully avoiding the adverse impacts of regime change. 
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By contrast, maintaining good relations with only one political party may hurt the connected 
group by reducing its political flexibility. Empirical and anecdotal evidence has indicated that 
being loyal to the ruling party may make firms victims of discrimination and retribution by an 
opposition party that comes into power (Byun, 2004; Siegel, 2007). Due to the KMT’s 
political dominance in Taiwan for over half a century, many business groups were over-
embedded with KMT. Taiwan Cement, one of the largest business groups in Taiwan, was 
closely tied to KMT by having its founder Koo Chen-Fu serving as a member of KMT 
Central Standing Committee from 1982 to mid-1990s and playing golf with the 4th KMT 
president of Taiwan, Lee Teng-Hui since 1992. After DPP came into power in 2000, however, 
its net income dropped from 38th in 1999 to 51st
However, there are also disadvantages of maintaining a diverse portfolio of political 
ties. First, business groups have to bear relatively higher maintenance costs in the form of 
campaign contributions, joint investment with party-run businesses, gifts and banquets (Yang, 
1994). Second, being friendly to all the political parties may reduce the level of trust obtained 
from each party, making political ties less effective in acquiring scarce and valuable 
resources and tacit information. It also signals the disloyalty of the group to each political 
party, which may induce discrimination and retribution by powerful political parties.  
 in 2001. The number of industries it entered 
dropped from 8 in 1998 to 0 in 2004 and anecdotal evidence indicates that this maybe due to 
the lack of financial support from the DPP government (Wealth Magazine, 2004).  
We argue that the net effect on market entry by the focal group is contingent on the 
distribution of political power among the rival political parties. Specifically, when political 
power is dominated by the ruling party which has control of both executive and legislative 
authority, the other political parties have little political maneuver. To the extent that the 
benefits accessible through political ties is a function of the prominence of connected 
political parties (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Gabbay and Leenders, 1999; Lin, 1999), the 
 22 
political ties to powerless opposition parties are redundant to the focal group as they do not 
provide resources and information conducive to the expansion of business scope. The 
potential benefits of tapping into the diverse resource profiles of different political parties by 
maintaining a diverse portfolio of political ties can hardly be realized.  
Moreover, the relative bargaining power of the focal group tends to be weak when 
political power is disproportionately concentrated on the ruling party. The ruling party does 
not face challenges from the powerless opposition parties and it has tight control over 
economic resources and the competitive environment (Bonardi, Holburn and Bergh, 2006). 
The focal group has to depend on the ruling party to a great extent so as to construct a 
favorable external environment, while the ruling party depends less on the group for its 
support in elections as it already possess an advantageous position in party competition. The 
weak bargaining power of the focal group not only undermines its ability to acquire resources 
and information, but also makes it easily become the target of retribution by the ruling party, 
making its entry into new industries difficult. 
In addition, when the ruling party has dominant political power, the chance of 
unexpected change in political regime are relatively small because the ruling party is able to 
reinforce its rule by obtaining electoral advantages and suppressing opponents with its 
political power. As a result, the value of political flexibility by maintaining a diverse portfolio 
of political ties is greatly depreciated. Therefore, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 4a: The more diverse political ties to political parties, the fewer entries 
into unrelated industries by business groups in emerging economies when the ruling 
party has dominant political power.  
When political parties are equally powerful, a diverse portfolio of political ties 
facilitates market entry of the connected group. Since each political party controls either 
administrative agency or legislative branch and thus has certain resources, information and 
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privileged treatments to allocate, getting connected to multiple political parties provides 
business groups with opportunities to exploit diverse and abundant benefits from its political 
partners. Moreover, party competition is likely to intensify when political parties are evenly 
matched in political power. The intense political competition drives political parties to rely on 
business groups for campaign contributions, votes and information (Mueller, 2003). 
Consequently, business groups enjoy stronger bargaining power which makes politicians 
more willing to “trade” policy favors, valuable resources, and information for support in 
elections (Baron, 2001). Business groups connected to distinct political parties can thus 
expand into unrelated industries easily by taking advantage of their diverse resources and 
non-redundant information.  
When political parties are evenly powerful, the chance of political regime change is 
great. The benefit of obtaining political flexibility by maintaining good relations with rival 
parties becomes significant. Political flexibility ensures security of access to critical resources 
and information no matter which party comes into power. This is particularly important for 
the expansion into unrelated industries which usually requires large amount of investment 
and stable flows of complementary assets (Siegfried and Evans, 1994).  
Additionally, when political power is evenly distributed, groups with a diverse 
portfolio of political ties are not likely to be discriminated or retaliated by political parties 
because of their stronger relative bargaining power. Equally powerful parties competing with 
each other for support from business groups are less motivated to impose punitive measures 
against groups which keep connections with their political enemies.  Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 4b: The more diverse the political ties to political parties with political 
power, the more entries into unrelated industries by business groups in emerging 
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economies when the political power is evenly distributed between the ruling party and 
one of the opposition parties. 
Contingencies imposed by group debt ratio and group experience of market entry 
After articulating the overarching relationship between diversity of portfolios of 
political ties and the entry activities of connected business groups, we argue that such 
relationship is likely to vary across business groups with different internal resource profiles. 
To enter new markets, business groups need to employ a large amount of resources, including 
both internally accumulated ones and externally derived ones from political ties. As groups 
are endowed with distinct internal resource profiles, their dependence on political ties to 
acquire resources for market entry is likely to differ from each other. Thus, we expect the 
effects of portfolios of political ties on market entry to vary across business groups with 
distinct internal resource endowments4
Debt ratio as a contingency 
.  Specifically, we examine how groups with different 
levels of debt ratio and experience of market entry are influenced by their political ties when 
entering into new markets. These contingent factors each exert their effects by either 
enhancing the benefits of diversity and flexibility or exacerbating the costs of retribution. 
Debt ratio of a business group indicates its dependence on external financial resources 
(Baker, 1990; Pfeffer, 1987). Highly-leveraged groups are more dependent on external 
financial resources relative to counterparts with low debt ratios. Existing literature has 
demonstrated that political ties serve as an important channel for firms to acquire financial 
resources. Faccio (2006) finds that politically connected firms have easier access to debt 
financing and enjoy lower taxation. Khwaja and Mian (2004) find that politically linked firms 
borrowed twice as much as non-connected firms from public banks in Pakistan. Johnson and 
                                                 
4 The contingent effects of internal resources may also be applicable to dyadic political ties examined in H1-H3. However, 
we focus on portfolios of political ties instead because our major interest is to explore how political ties as an external source 
of resources may affect market entry jointly with internal resources possessed by business groups.  
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Mitton (2003) shows that connections to politicians in power serve as critical conduits for 
government subsidies in Malaysia. Therefore, political ties to the political parties which 
control financial resources are more valuable to highly leveraged groups than to groups with 
low debt ratio.    
The ruling party controls the government and thus has power to allocate financial 
resources by using its influence on government-owned banks. It is found that 42% of the total 
assets of the 10 largest banks in 92 countries are controlled by the government-controlled 
banks (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002). Since banks operate across the whole 
economy rather than in a defined industry, politicians of the ruling party have great 
opportunities to channel funds to favored firms so as to maintain and increase their political 
power (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Dinç (2005) shows that, in both emerging and developed 
economies, government-owned banks increase their lending in election years as compared to 
private banks so as to obtain votes from the business. It was reported that the DPP President 
of Taiwan, Chen Shui-Bian, provided large amounts of preferential loans through 
government-controlled financial institutions to firms which supported him in the Presidential 
Election in 2000 (Wealth Magazine, 2003). The opposition party with legislative authority 
may also indirectly provide financial resources with connected firms by favorably altering 
regulations regarding raising funds through bank loans, stock issuance, and venture capital.  
When the ruling party has dominant political power, its politicians are likely to reward 
allies and punish opponents by providing bank credits with groups connected only to it but 
not those tied to both the ruling party and opposition parties. Opposition parties are not able 
to provide financial resources due to the lack of political power. As a result, a diverse 
portfolio of political ties negatively affects the expansion of businesses scope. However, this 
negative effect tends to be greater for groups with higher debt ratio because they need the 
financial resources more urgently than those with low debt ratio to move into the new 
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markets. Without the financial support by the government-controlled banks, they are unlikely 
to raise sufficient capital for expansion.  
When political parties are evenly matched in political power, groups with connections 
to multiple parties have opportunities to tap on multiple sources of capital. Moreover, due to 
their high dependence on the groups, both the ruling party and opposition parties are unlikely 
to exclude groups tied to their political enemies from the list of financing. Hence, a diverse 
portfolio of political ties has a positive effect on the market expansion of business groups. 
Groups with higher debt ratios are likely to benefit more from the diverse political ties 
because the diverse and abundant financial resources acquired through these ties relax its 
resource constraints and enable them to make investments in more unrelated industries. Thus, 
we propose: 
Hypothesis 5: The higher the debt ratio of business groups, the stronger the 
hypothesized relationships in H4a and H4b will be. 
Experience of market entry as a contingency 
Experience of market entry is a valuable resource which enables business groups to be 
less dependent on political ties to obtain information and resources for expansion. Since 
market entry is a learning-by-doing process (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Amsden and Hikino, 
1994), groups with rich experience of market entry are likely to develop a superior capability 
of detecting the trend of economic growth and industrial development, understanding 
economic policies and regulations, and thus identifying market opportunities timely.  
Moreover, compared to those with focused business portfolios, experienced groups in market 
entry tend to have multiple external sources to acquire various resources supportive to entries 
into new markets. It is found that diversified Indian business groups form strategic alliances 
with foreign providers of technology and finance more easily than single-business firms 
mainly due to their good reputation for honesty and reliability (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). 
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Diversified Taiwanese business groups, such as Formosa Plastics and Ta Tung, established 
systematically more external linkages with foreign companies and venture capitalists than 
less diversified counterparts (Sheng, 2003). Taking advantage of their long-established 
relationships with suppliers, customers, investors, and foreign partners, groups undertaking 
market entries frequently may enjoy diverse and abundant resources derived externally. In 
addition, to the extent that business groups in emerging economies often enter into new 
industries by applying imported foreign technologies and managerial skills to local market 
(Hikino and Amsden, 1994; Kock and Guillen, 2001), groups which expand frequently are 
able to unpack and assimilate foreign technologies and management expertise efficiently, and 
thus enjoy advantageous competitive positions and more opportunities to penetrate into new 
markets.  
When the ruling party dominates political power, groups experienced in market entry 
may be hurt less than less experienced ones by maintaining a diverse portfolio of political ties. 
To the extent that experienced groups are equipped with a superior capability in identifying, 
collecting and integrating resources from various origins, the discrimination and retaliation 
imposed by the ruling party are less likely to impede the groups to expand their business 
scope. These groups are still able to expand by resorting to their ability to identify market 
opportunities, internalize advanced foreign knowledge, and pool resources from diverse 
conduits.  
By the same token, when political power is distributed evenly, experienced groups are 
likely to benefit less from their diverse political ties mainly due to their access to 
heterogeneous information and resources through various channels. Moreover, the political 
flexibility derived from a diverse portfolio of political ties tends to be less valuable to 
experienced groups as they can still successfully enter new markets by taking advantage of 
their superior capability in establishing and managing new plants even if they are negatively 
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targeted by any political party after political regime changes. In line with discussions above, 
we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 6: The more experience of market entry business groups have, the weaker 
the hypothesized relationships in H4a and H4b will be. 
 
DATA AND MEASURES 
Data source and sample 
The empirical analysis is based on the data of the largest 250 business groups in Taiwan 
in two periods: 1998-2000 and 2004-2006. Since the DPP won the presidency and replaced 
KMT as the ruling party in 2000, we collect information about political ties in 1998 and 2004 
to capture the distinct rivalry situations where the ruling party and the opposition party 
switched places. We further explain the market entry activities of business groups during 
1998-2000 and 2004-2006 based on their political ties established by 1998 and 2004 
respectively.  
The major data source of entry activities by business group is the Business Groups in 
Taiwan (BGT) directory, compiled by the China Credit Information Service (CCIS) in Taipei. 
CCIS is the oldest and most prestigious credit-checking agency in Taiwan and an affiliate of 
Standard & Poor’s in the United States. The BGT directory collects information on the top 
250 groups in sales and is confined to groups whose principal firms are registered in Taiwan5
                                                 
5 The number of business groups included in the BGT directory differs slightly across years. It collects information about the 
largest 180 business groups in 1998 and 250 business groups in 2004 respectively.  
. 
CCIS defines a business group as “a coherent business organization including several 
independent enterprises.” Since its second edition (which was published in 1974), BGT has 
consistently maintained the following criteria in its selection of business groups: (1) more 
than 51 percent of the ownership must be native capital; (2) the group must have three or 
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more independent firms; (3) the group must have more than NT$5 billion in total sales6
For each business group, the directory provides information about its top management, 
size, history and financial performance. For each member firm, it provides information about 
its line of business, based on which we identify its industry. Since there is no ready-to-use 
industry coding in the BGT directory, we assigned the firm a two-digit industrial code 
following the 2000 version of the Standard Industrial Classification published by the 
Taiwanese government. After aggregating the industry information of all member firms to the 
group level, we compared the industrial profile of the group between t and t+1. We 
considered industries with different 2-digit SIC codes to be unrelated industries. Groups 
entered unrelated industries if distinct 2-digit industries which were not present at t appeared 
at t+1 in their business portfolios.  
 and 
(4) the core firm of the group must be registered in Taiwan. This directory is the most 
comprehensive and reliable source for business groups in Taiwan. Several previous studies 
rely on this source (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001; Luo and Chung, 2005).  
To track the entry activities of the largest 250 business groups, we collected information 
on their industrial portfolio every two years (i.e. 1998-2000 and 2004-2006). The two-year 
window spans a moderate time period which is likely to capture entries into unrelated 
industries. To track the change of industrial portfolio over time, we only included groups 
which were present in two consecutive issues of the BGT directory. The sample of 1998 
consists of 167 observations and the sample of 2004 contains 227 observations.  
According to social structure and the principles of how political ties operate in Taiwan 
(Hsu, 1991), we used different methods to collect two different types of political ties: formal 
position interlocks and informal ties. For the formal position interlocks, we collected data on 
key position holders in both business groups and the political circle. We then cross-checked 
                                                 
6 This number changes over years as business groups become bigger. 
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the names of business groups with the names in the major political institutions to identify 
position interlocks. With regard to informal political ties, we focus on family and social 
relationships between group executives and prominent political figures. Specifically, we 
coded three major types of informal ties: 1) familial and marital ties, 2) close friendships and 
same-hometown relationships, and 3) trade associations and social club memberships. After 
combining formal and informal political ties, we came up with the political ties with each 
political party by referring to the party affiliation of connected political actors. The specific 
data sources and coding schemes used to measure political ties are discussed in the Appendix.  
Compared to the measure of political ties in prior research, our approach of measurement 
is an improvement in two aspects. First, instead of adopting indirect approaches by using 
subject ratings, indexes and reports collected by other agencies (e.g. Fisman, 2001; Bertrand, 
et al., 2004), this paper uses a more direct approach that locates specific ties between business 
executives and politicians. Second, almost all existing studies have adopted synchronized 
research designs, examining political ties and firm strategy within the same period. We 
collected data of political ties for two time periods (1998 and 2004), enabling us to identify 
the role of political ties at different levels of rivalry between connected political parties and 
address the issue of reverse causality. In addition, we referred to the Largest Corporations in 
Taiwan by CCIS to collect the sales and ROA at industry level.  
Table 3A shows the characteristics of Taiwanese business groups in our sample. There 
are 167 groups in the 1998 sample and 227 groups in the 2004 sample. The total number of 
group-year observations is 394. Among the sample groups in 1998, 62% are politically 
connected. In the sample of 2004, however, only 45% of the groups were embedded in 
political networks. With regard to the size of sample groups, the number of group affiliates 
increased over time, rising from 11 affiliates in 1998 to 34 affiliates in 2004.  
********** Table 3A about here ********** 
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Dependent variable: Entry into new industries 
To test the proposed relationships between political ties and entry activities, we counted 
the number of entries into new 2-digit SIC in a 2-year span (1998-2000, 2004-2006).  
Independent variables 
We use the number of ties between a group and the political parties as the measure of 
political ties (including both formal and informal political ties). We distinguish between ties 
with KMT and ties with DPP. Moreover, we measure the diversity of portfolios of political 
ties using a variation of the Herfindal-Hirschman index:  
D=1-∑
=
k
i
iP
1
2 , 
where D is the diversity measure and P is the percentage of political ties with KMT or DPP. 
This index ranges from 0 to 1. The closer it is to 1, the more diverse the portfolio of political 
ties.  
Control variables 
Following previous studies (Chang, 1996; Khanna and Palepu, 2000), we controlled for a 
set of group characteristics that may also affect the entry activities of the group: group size, 
group age, group profitability, group debt ratio, group diversification, group experience of 
market entry and group main industry. Group Size is measured by logged total group assets, 
adjusted by the 2000 consumer price index (Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 2000: 179). Group 
age is the number of years since the first member firm of a group was established. Group 
ROA refers to the annual group return on assets. Debt ratio is the ratio of liability to total 
assets of the group. Group diversification has been found to enhance group performance by 
promoting economies of scope (Amsden and Hikino, 1994; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). We 
use the following formula to measure it: ),/1ln( jj PP ×∑ where jP is defined as the 
percentage of group sales in industry sector j (Palepu, 1985). The identification of industry 
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sector is based on 4-digit product categories defined in the Standard Industrial Classification 
published by the Taiwanese government in 2000. Experience of market entry is measured as 
the stock of market entries conducted by the group since 1990, which was the onset of large-
scale economic liberalization in Taiwan. Since the value of previous experience depreciates 
as market conditions change, we used a 20% depreciation rate to calculate the stock of market 
entries over time. We also controlled for the main industry of the group across 12 industries7. 
The industry with the largest proportion of group sales was coded as the major business line8. 
To the extent that the entry and exit activities are correlated to each other9
Additionally, to the extent that industry attractiveness is critical to explain firms’ entry 
into certain markets rather than others (Porter, 1980), we created two industry-level variables 
to capture the influence of industry attractiveness on market entry. Industry Profitability is 
the aggregation of the ROA of industries that business groups entered weighted by the 
percentage of group sales in the entered industries. Industry Sales, which indicates the 
industry attractiveness in terms of volumes of sales, is measured as aggregate sales in 
industries that groups entered, weighted by the percentage of group sales in the entered 
industries. 
 (Chang, 1996; 
Chung and Luo, 2008), we controlled for the number of exits from incumbent 2-digit SIC 
industries. We also controlled for the total number of political ties (the sum of KMT ties and 
DPP ties) when examining the effects of the diversity of political ties.  
Model specification 
We use the following baseline specification to test the relation between political ties and 
entry into new industries by business groups: 
                                                 
7 These industries are agriculture, food, textile, wood, chemical, non-metallic, metals, machinery, electrical/electronic, 
construction, real estate and financial services and retail.  
8 On average, the major business line contributed 67% of group sales.  
9 For example, business groups may exit less profitable industries and enter promising ones. 
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Entries into new industries = β + β1 (a vector of political tie variables) + β2 (a vector 
of group internal resources variables) + β3 (political tie variables*group internal 
resources variables) + β4
 
 (industry-level and group-level controls) + ε 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3B reports summary statistics of variables included in the analysis. It shows that 
there is significant variance in the entry activities of business groups as well as their political 
ties with KMT and DPP. The mean of diversity of political ties is 0.10, implying that the 
majority of sample groups maintains political ties with only one political party Indeed, out of 
the 103 politically connected business groups in our sample, 90 groups were connected only 
to KMT and none of them maintained ties only to DPP as of 1998. In 2004, among the 103 
business groups with political ties, 36 groups were tied solely to KMT and 16 groups were 
connected only to DPP. Table 4A to Table 4C report the correlation matrix of variables in 
1998, 2004 and the combined two years respectively.  
********** Table 3B, Table 4A-4C about here ********** 
Regression results 
We used the negative binomial model to test the empirical implications. The negative 
binomial model is appropriate for analyzing count data when over-dispersion of the 
conditional mean and variance functions violates the assumptions of Poisson regression 
(Greene, 1993).  
Table 5 reports the pooled regression results of the effect of political ties on business 
groups’ entry into new industries. The left-half of the table shows the results in 1998 and the 
right-half of the table indicates the results in 2004. Model 1 and Model 7 contain only control 
variables, serving as baseline models. The inclusion of the two variables for political ties in 
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Model 2 and Model 8 improves the overall model fit over the baseline models (d.f.=2, 
P<0.01for Model 2 and P<0.05 for Model 8). In Model 3 and Model 9, we added in the 
diversity of political ties while controlling for the total number of political ties. In Model 4 
and Model 10, the addition of the interaction term between diversity of political ties and debt 
ratio improves the overall fit compared to Model 3 and Model 9 respectively (d.f. =1, P<0.01). 
Similarly, including the interaction term between diversity of political ties and experience of 
market entry in Model 5 and Model 11 improves the model fit relative to Model 3 (d.f. =1, 
P<0.01) and Model 9 (d.f.=1, P<0.05) respectively. Model 6, which is a fully specified model, 
also shows enhanced overall fit compared to Model 4 (d.f.=1, P<0.05) and Model 5 (d.f.=1, 
P<0.05). Similar result regarding Model 12 is found when it is compared with Model 10 
(d.f.=1, P<0.05) and Model 11(d.f.=1, P<0.01).   
Hypothesis 1 predicts that political ties with the ruling party will facilitate business 
groups’ entry into new industries. The results in Model 2 show that the coefficient of political 
ties with KMT in 1998 displays the expected positive trend and is statistically significant 
(P<0.01). Similarly, as shown in Model 8, the coefficient of political ties with DPP in 2004 is 
also positive and statistically significant. These results are consistent with the prediction in 
Hypothesis 1. In a negative binomial regression, a unit change in an independent variable X 
leads to changes in the expected count, Y, by a factor of exp(β), holding other variables 
constant. As shown in Model 2, an increase of one political tie to KMT is related to a 1.5% 
increase in the number of unrelated industries entered in 1998 (β=0.015, [exp(0.015)*1-1] 
=0.015). One more political tie to DPP is associated with a 12.5% increase in the entry into 
unrelated industries in 2004.  
Hypothesis 2 proposes that political ties with the opposition party with legislative 
authority promote market entry. In Model 8, the coefficient of KMT tie is positive, but not 
statistically significant. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. Hypothesis 3 predicts that 
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political ties with opposition parties which do not have any political power will impede the 
entry activities of business groups. Consistent with our expectation, political ties with DPP in 
Model 2 are negatively related to groups’ entry into unrelated industries (P<0.05). One more 
DPP tie is related to a 22% decrease in the number of unrelated industries entered in 1998.  
Model 3 and Model 9 test the impact of a diverse portfolio of political ties on entries. The 
results show that diverse political ties had a negative effect in 1998 (P<0.05), but had a 
positive effect on group expansion in 2004 (P<0.01). Hence, Hypothesis 4a and Hypothesis 
4b, which predict the contingent effects of diverse portfolios of political ties, are supported. 
One standard deviation of increase in diversity of political tie is associated with a 29% 
decrease in the number of entries into unrelated industries in 1998 and a 27% increase in the 
number of unrelated industries entered in 2004. 
  In Model 4 and Model 10, we added the interaction term between diversity of 
political ties and group debt ratio to test H5, which posited a reinforced relationship between 
political ties and group entries. The expected negative trend (P<0.01) of the interaction term 
in Model 4 and the positive trend (P<0.01) of the interaction term in Model 10 show that 
groups with high debt ratio were hurt more by diverse political ties in 1998 and benefited 
more from them in 2004, supporting Hypothesis 5. Specifically, for groups with diversity of 
political tie at mean level (0.10), one standard deviation increase in debt ratio is related to a 
29% decrease in the number of unrelated industries entered in 1998 and a 37% increase in the 
number of entries into unrelated industries in 2004.  
To test Hypothesis 6, we introduced the interaction term between diversity of political tie 
and experience of market entry in Model 5 and Model 11 respectively. We found that the 
interaction term displayed a positive trend and was statistically significant (P<0.05) in 1998. 
It showed a negative trend and was statistically significant (P<0.10) in 2004. This is 
consistent with our prediction in Hypothesis 6, which indicates that groups experienced in 
 36 
market entry suffer less from diverse political ties when the ruling party has dominant 
political power and benefit less from diverse political ties when the political parties are 
evenly matched in political power. Moreover, for groups with average level of diversity of 
political tie (0.1), one standard deviation increase in experience of market entry is associated 
with a 13% increase in the number of entries into unrelated industries in 1998 and a 3% 
decrease in the number of unrelated industries entered in 2004. The forgoing findings about 
proposed hypotheses stay in the fully specified Model 6 and Model 12.  
********** Table 5 about here ********** 
Checks for reverse causality 
The evidence we get so far shows a strong association between political ties and business 
groups’ expansion into new industries. However, this result should be interpreted with 
caution because it is possible that entry into new industries leads to the establishment of 
political tie. For instance, politicians may prefer to partner with diversified business groups 
which are more likely to provide votes and campaign contributions due to their large scope of 
production. In the meantime, the more diversified a business group, the higher the probability 
for the group to interact with politicians in different settings. To address this causality issue, 
we compared the emergence of political ties to groups’ entry into new industries and 
observed that the personal relationships between business leaders and political actors in our 
dataset largely predate the expansion of connected business groups.  
Moreover, we tested the causality issue directly by running a set of regressions using 
the change of various types of political ties between 1998 and 2004 as dependent variable, 
and the number of entered industries in 1998 as independent variable. The control variables 
remained the same. The regression results show that the coefficient of number of entries in all 
the models is not significant. Hence, it can be concluded that entries into new industries by 
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business groups are not associated with the change of political ties possessed by group 
leaders. 
Robustness check 
 As the sample groups in 1998 and 2004 are not exactly the same, our results may be 
driven by some unobserved group characteristics rather than simply portfolios of political ties. 
To ensure that our results are not sensitive to the composition of groups in the two different 
periods, we examined the entry activities of a subset of business groups that appeared in both 
1998 and 2004 (208 groups) with the same models in Table 5. The results of such analysis are 
qualitatively the same as those based on the entire sample.  
 
  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This study is motivated by the lack of research on the interplay between business and 
political parties, an agenda that becomes particularly salient when the political environment 
of firms is affected by the competition or rivalry between two or more political parties. Under 
such circumstances, firms need to consider with which parties they should maintain congenial 
relationships, which have significant implications for firm strategy such as new market entry. 
Instead of looking at dyadic, independent ties, we focus on the portfolio of political ties, 
which depicts interactions between a firm and political parties and captures the overall impact 
of political ties on its market entry. Using Taiwanese business groups as a research context, 
we develop a contingent theory of the effect of political ties on the entry into unrelated 
industries. By differentiating political parties in their political power, we depict the 
prominence of partners in the political networks of business groups and investigate the 
differential effects of each type of partners on the focal business groups. Furthermore, we 
identify a set of contingencies that highlight the underlying mechanisms of resource provision, 
political flexibility, and retribution through which a portfolio of political ties exerts its effects. 
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Our results show that political ties affect market entry by business groups both individually 
and in combination. Consistent with findings in the network literature (Gulati and Higgins, 
2003; Stuart, 2000; Stuart, et al., 1999; Zaheer and Bell, 2005), ties to prominent political 
parties are facilitative to market entry, while those with powerless parties are detrimental. 
Moreover, the effect of a diverse portfolio of political ties on market entry by business groups 
depends on distribution of political power among political parties, and the interdependence 
between groups and connected political parties. Further, internal resources of groups, such as 
debt ratio and experience of market entry, moderate the effects of political ties portfolios. 
This study contributes to the literature on corporate political strategy, on portfolio of network 
ties, on market entry, and on the organization of government. 
This study advances the literature of corporate political strategy by examining the 
political strategy firms should adopt to interact with political parties. Basically, in a 
pluralistic political system, when firms select political parties to be connected with, they need 
to take into consideration the competition between political parties. The results of 
competition for presidency and legislative seats determine the distribution of political power, 
and thus the resources controlled by political parties, as well as their dependence on firms. In 
particular, firms should get connected to the ruling party and avoid relationships with 
opposition parties without political power. Regarding ties to the opposition party with 
legislative authority, we did not find the expected positive effect on market entry. 
Considering the fact that it usually takes long time for the favorable laws, rules, and 
regulations to be approved and take effect, our two-year window may not effectively capture 
the impact of such ties. Moreover, when the competition is intense, firms benefit from a 
diverse portfolio of political ties. When the ruling party has absolute advantage in the 
political competition, firms tied solely to the ruling party have advantages against those with 
diverse political partners. Additionally, it is found that political ties are not equally important 
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to firms. Instead, the efficacy of political ties varies depending on the internal resource profile 
of the connected firm. Adopting the right political strategy to interact with political parties is 
more important for firms with high debt ratio and scant experience of market entry. These 
findings are consistent with the contingent perspective of political capital (Peng and Luo, 
2000) and further improve our understanding of the contingency factors.   
This study also sheds light on the literature on portfolio of network ties by investigating 
how the rivalry between alters affects outcomes of the focal firm in the context of political 
networks. Prior studies in the context of alliance portfolio showed positive effects of alter 
competition on firm performance (Lavie, 2007). However, we find that rivalry between alters 
does not necessarily benefit the focal firm when alters have punitive power over the focal 
firm. The brokerage benefits derived by the focal firm from alter competition may be offset 
by the retribution imposed by alters. The contrast of the different findings suggests that the 
impact of rivalry between alters on the focal firm is contingent on the nature of relationships 
between the focal firm and its alters.  
Our results also hold important implications for the literature about entry activities by 
multi-business firms. Entry into new industries is a major corporate strategic activity with 
important implications for the growth of firms because it involves creation of new markets 
and alters the allocation of available resources among business lines (Montgomery and 
Hariharan, 1991). Existing literature on the entry activities of firms mainly focuses on how 
surplus internal resources drive firms to move into new product markets and shows that firms 
are likely to enter markets which require resources similar to firms’ existing resources (Chang, 
1996; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). Although these streams of research significantly 
contribute to understanding market entry, the overlook of external factors such as ties to the 
dominant political power is unfortunate because these factors often influence the resource 
profile and external competitive environment of firms (Fisman, 2001; Holburn and Vanden 
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Bergh, 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Peng and Luo, 2000).  
This study bridges the corporate political strategy and market entry research by 
highlighting the contingent role of political ties in market entry. It shows that a firm’s 
linkages to political organizations play an important role in affecting its capability to expand 
into new industries by shaping its resource profile, legitimacy, and competitive environment. 
Furthermore, the findings of contingent effects of firms’ internal resources (i.e. debt ratio and 
experience of market entry) on the relationship between portfolios of political ties and market 
entry integrate the internal and external resources derived by firms into the theoretical 
framework of market entry, providing a more comprehensive theory about how the business 
scope of multi-business firms is determined.  
 Finally, the study sheds light on how the organization of government as a result of 
party competition affects the policy making processes and the efficacy of political ties 
portfolios. In particular, we argue and demonstrate that when the political power is 
predominantly controlled by the ruling party, and consequently there is strong alignment 
between the executive and legislative branches, a focused portfolio of ties with the ruling 
party is particularly effective for a firm to gain favorable policies and manage material 
reliance. This is ascribed to the ruling party’s ability to initiate, promote, and implement 
policies for its own interests without encountering any substantial resistance from opposition 
parties. In contrast, when the government is fragmented to the extent that the ruling party has 
executive authority and an opposition party possesses legislative authority, a diverse portfolio 
of political ties is more beneficial to market entry as it enables the connected firm to tap on 
diverse pools of resources while refraining from potential retaliation imposed by political 
parties. In so doing, we specifically respond to the call by Ring and his colleagues (2005) to 
study the interactions between executive and legislative branches under unified vs. divided 
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governments and build a bridge between strategic management literature and the political 
science research.  
 Overall, we explore the market entry consequences, and contingent effects, of 
political ties between multi-business firms and political parties in the context of a pluralist 
political system. Our research integrates and contributes to the four literatures of corporate 
political strategy, networks, market entry, and organization of government. Our holistic 
approach enables us to better understand the hitherto unobserved connections across them, 
and in turn allows us to develop insights into the broader question as to when and how 
political ties matter for firms. 
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Table 1. Distributions of Political Power and Relative Bargaining Power 
 
 Unevenly Distributed Political 
Power 
Evenly Distributed Political 
Power 
Stakes of the focal firm Constant Constant 
Alternatives available to the focal firm Low High 
Bargaining power of the focal firm Low High 
Stakes of the ruling party Low High 
Alternatives available to the ruling party  Constant Constant 
Bargaining power of the ruling party High Low 
Bargaining power of the focal firm relative to that of the ruling party Weak Strong 
Stakes of the opposition party Low High 
Alternatives available to the opposition party Constant Constant 
Bargaining power of the opposition party High Low 
Bargaining power of the focal firm relative to that of the opposition party Weak Strong 
                  
 
Figure 1. Framework of Portfolios of Political Ties and Market Entry 
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• Evenly distributed 
 
• Unevenly distributed 
Prominence of Political Parties 
• Most prominent: ruling party with executive and legislative 
authority 
• Moderately prominent: ruling party with only executive 
authority; opposition party with legislative authority 
• Least prominent: opposition party without legislative power 
Relative Bargaining Power of the Focal Firm 
 
• Stakes of the focal firm and political parties 
 
• Alternatives available to the focal firm and 
political parties 
Effect of Portfolios of Political 
Ties on Market Entry Punitive Power 
Table 2A. Presidential Elections 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2B. Legislative Elections 
 
Year DPP KMT Others 
1998 70/225=31% 123/225=55% 32/225=14% 
2001 87/225=39% 114/225=51% 24/225=10% 
2004 89/225=40% 113/225=50% 23/225=10% 
 
                       Note: Percentage numbers are the ratios of elected seats to total seats. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Presidential Election in 2000 
Political Party Total Votes Percentage Result 
Democratic Progress Party (DPP) 4,977,737 39.3% Elected 
Nationalist Party (KMT) 2,925,513 23.1% Failed 
Presidential  Election in 2004 
Political Party Total Votes Percentage Result 
Democratic Progress Party (DPP) 6,470,839 50.11% Elected 
Nationalist Party (KMT)  6,443,022 49.89% Failed 
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Table 3A. Sample Composition of Taiwanese Business Groups, 1998 and 2004 
 
Year Number of Business Groups 
Number of 
Politically Connected 
Groups 
Percentage of 
Politically Connected 
Groups 
Number of Group 
Affiliates 
Average Number of 
Group Affiliates 
1998 167 103 62% 1820 11 
2004 227 103 45% 7773 34 
Total 394 206 52% 9593 24 
 
 
 
Table 3B. Summary Statistics 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variables 
Entry 2.89 3.27 0 18 
Independent Variables     
Political tie with KMT 3.49 7.97 0 69 
Political tie with DPP 0.53 1.43 0 10 
Diversity of political tie 0.10 0.16 0 1 
Control Variables  
Total political tie 4.02 8.49 0 71 
Exit 1.41 1.55 0 10 
Group diversification 0.90 0.57 0 2.58 
Group size (logged assets) 10.25 1.53 6.40 14.84 
Group age 28.44 13.60 0 80 
Group ROA 3.87 8.27 -66.27 45.56 
Debt ratio 53.70 18.24 6.89 96.24 
Experience of market entry  5.54 4.84 0 44 
Industry profitability 6.21 3.73 -4.76 33.53 
Industry sales 25.73 14.64 -6.25 107.13 
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Table 4A. Correlation matrix (1998 and 2004 combined) 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.Entry 1.00              
2.Exit 0.35* 1.00             
3.Political tie with KMT 0.51* 0.39* 1.00            
4.Political tie with DPP 0.10 0.22* 0.28* 1.00           
5.Total political tie 0.53* 0.40* 0.96* 0.43* 1.00          
6.Diversity of political ties 0.02 0.23* 0.06 0.39* 0.18* 1.00         
7.Group diversification 0.35* 0.40* 0.41* 0.20* 0.41* 0.16* 1.00        
8.Group size 0.32* 0.36* 0.45* 0.41* 0.45* 0.39* 0.47* 1.00       
9. Group age 0.30* 0.29* 0.28* 0.02 0.26* -0.04 0.32* 0.12* 1.00      
10.Group ROA -0.06 -0.19 -0.10 -0.02 -0.10 0.00 -0.16 -0.11 -0.13 1.00     
11. Debt ratio 0.07 0.19* 0.26* 0.24* 0.29* 0.16 0.22* 0.32* -0.01 -0.42* 1.00    
12. Experience of market entry 0.01 0.24* 0.26* 0.24* 0.28* 0.15* 0.28* 0.24* 0.00 -0.01 0.16* 1.00   
13.Industry profitability -0.09 0.10* 0.04 0.11* 0.06 0.16* 0.11* 0.13* -0.05 0.04 0.11* 0.18* 1.00  
14.Industry sales -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.04 0.21* -0.01 0.17* 1.00 
                   * p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 53 
Table 4B. Correlation matrix (year=1998) 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.Entry 1.00              
2.Exit 0.26* 1.00             
3.Political tie with KMT 0.52* 0.08 1.00            
4.Political tie with DPP -0.01 0.15 0.14 1.00           
5.Total political tie 0.50* 0.09 0.98* 0.10* 1.00          
6.Diversity of political ties -0.17 0.19 -0.03 0.66* 0.01 1.00         
7.Group diversification 0.47* 0.28* 0.47* 0.09 0.42* -0.02 1.00        
8.Group size 0.42* 0.17* 0.54* 0.24* 0.53* 0.08 0.49* 1.00       
9. Group age 0.27* 0.31* 0.22* 0.04 0.26* 0.05 0.45* 0.30* 1.00      
10.Group ROA -0.01 -0.21* -0.08 -0.03 -0.09 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.18* 1.00     
11. Debt ratio 0.13 0.10 0.31* 0.11 0.31* 0.08 0.23* 0.43* 0.11 -0.40* 1.00    
12. Experience of market entry 0.21* 0.15 0.36* -0.03 0.36* -0.03 0.38* 0.27* 0.08 -0.04 0.18* 1.00   
13.Industry profitability 0.17* 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.09 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.01 -0.16* 1.00  
14.Industry sales -0.05 0.12 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.01 0.08 1.00 
                   * p<0.05 
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Table 4C. Correlation matrix (year=2004) 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.Entry 1.00              
2.Exit 0.57* 1.00             
3.Political tie with KMT 0.55* 0.62* 1.00            
4.Political tie with DPP 0.38* 0.25* 0.34* 1.00           
5.Total political tie 0.47* 0.42* 0.96* 0.61* 1.00          
6.Diversity of political ties 0.37* 0.15 0.17 0.45* 0.26* 1.00         
7.Group diversification 0.34* 0.44* 0.42* 0.24* 0.42* 0.18 1.00        
8.Group size 0.40* 0.48* 0.36* 0.52* 0.51* 0.44* 0.42* 1.00       
9. Group age 0.29* 0.29* 0.28* 0.07 0.26* -0.05 0.28* 0.05 1.00      
10.Group ROA -0.10 -0.21* -0.12 -0.05 -0.12 -0.02 -0.24* -0.15* -0.08 1.00     
11. Debt ratio 0.17* 0.25* 0.27* 0.26* 0.30* 0.11 0.20* 0.38* -0.05 -0.51* 1.00    
12. Experience of market entry 0.12 0.27* 0.31* 0.21* 0.32* 0.08 0.24* 0.21* 0.04 -0.02 0.10 1.00   
13.Industry profitability 0.10 0.13* 0.11 -0.02 0.09 -0.07 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.10 1.00  
14.Industry sales 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.12 -0.03 -0.11 0.28* -0.08 0.14* 1.00 
                                * p<0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
Table 5. Effects of political ties on business groups’ entry into new industries using negative binomial models 
 
Variables 1998 2004 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Control variables 
Group diversification 0.083 
(0.117) 
-0.003 
(0.113) 
0.115 
(0.133) 
0.094 
(0.132) 
0.090 
(0.132) 
0.063 
(0.131) 
-0.051 
(0.153) 
-0.009 
(0.153) 
-0.196 
(0.176) 
-0.218 
(0.170) 
-0.184 
(0.173) 
-0.211 
(0.167) 
Group size (logged assets) 0.367*** 
(0.046) 
0.355*** 
(0.046) 
0.350*** 
(0.054) 
0.350*** 
(0.054) 
0.366*** 
(0.054) 
0.368*** 
(0.053) 
0.199*** 
(0.059) 
0.095 
(0.072) 
0.014 
(0.083) 
0.039 
(0.080) 
0.001 
(0.082) 
0.025 
(0.080) 
Group age 0.004 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.010* 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
Group ROA 0.005 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.025) 
-0.009 
(0.024) 
-0.002 
(0.024) 
-0.008 
(0.024) 
Debt ratio -0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
Exit 0.081** 
(0.039) 
0.110*** 
(0.037) 
0.102** 
(0.040) 
0.116*** 
(0.040) 
0.095** 
(0.040) 
0.108*** 
(0.039) 
0.206*** 
(0.043) 
0.232*** 
(0.049) 
0.123*** 
(0.048) 
0.135*** 
(0.046) 
0.114** 
(0.047) 
0.128*** 
(0.045) 
Experience of market entry 0.026 
(0.020) 
0.007 
(0.019) 
0.004 
(0.020) 
0.002 
(0.020) 
0.030 
(0.023) 
0.028 
(0.023) 
-0.011 
(0.010) 
-0.012 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.004 
(0.009) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
0.008 
(0.010) 
Industry profitability 0.071*** 
(0.023) 
0.062*** 
(0.022) 
0.051** 
(0.025) 
0.048* 
(0.025) 
0.054** 
(0.025) 
0.051** 
(0.025) 
0.005 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.015) 
-0.003 
(0.015) 
Industry sales -0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.014*** 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.006) 
Total political ties   0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.011** 
(0.005) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.131*** 
(0.732) 
  0.012 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
0.013 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
Independent variables 
Political  tie with KMT  0.015*** 
(0.005) 
     -0.006 
(0.010) 
    
Political tie with DPP  -0.255** 
(0.104) 
     0.118*** 
(0.044) 
    
Diversity of political tie   -2.116*** 
(0.673) 
-2.043*** 
(0.681) 
-1.454** 
(0.720) 
-1.460** 
(0.717) 
  1.492*** 
(0.405) 
1.297*** 
(0.395) 
1.487*** 
(0.398) 
1.297*** 
(0.388) 
Diversity of political tie*Debt ratio    -0.191** 
(0.089) 
 -0.191** 
(0.090) 
   0.173*** 
(0.053) 
 0.167*** 
(0.052) 
Diversity of political tie*Experience  
of market entry 
    0.263** 
(0.122) 
0.258** 
(0.120) 
    -0.059* 
(0.033) 
-0.054* 
(0.031) 
Constant -2.683*** 
(0.529) 
-2.325*** 
(0.531) 
-1.954*** 
(0.725) 
-1.763** 
(0.722) 
-2.36*** 
(0.736) 
-2.131*** 
(0.732) 
-2.382* 
(1.234) 
-1.534 
(1.285) 
0.060 
(0.959) 
-0.015 
(0.987) 
0.247 
(0.944) 
-0.600 
(0.982) 
Log likelihood -357.570 -348.260 -221.377 -218.092 -218.089 -216.759 -368.507 -362.979 -201.111 -195.734 -198.500 -194.228 
Pseudo R-square 14.78% 16.52% 19.85% 20.68% 20.72% 21.52% 11.70% 12.54% 10.40% 12.79% 12.11% 13.46% 
Number of observations 167 167 103 103 103 103 227 227 103 103 103 103 
Note: *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level. Two-tailed tests for all variables. 
       Standard errors are in the parentheses.  
       Dummy variables for industry are included in the regression models. 
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APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES AND CODING SCHEME OF POLITICAL TIES 
Data sources 
 To detect political ties between group leaders and key figures of political parties as 
accurate and comprehensive as possible, we referred to a wide set of publicly available 
data sources.  Names of group leaders, including chairman of the board, CEO, and major 
shareholder of group affiliates, were collected from the directory of Business groups in 
Taiwan (BGT) compiled by the China Credit Information Service (CCIS) in Taipei. For 
listed group firms in the main board of Taiwan Stock Exchange, we collected names of 
CEO, major shareholders, as well as all the directors and auditors from the Taiwan 
Economic Journal (TEJ) database. To the extent that Taiwanese firms prefer to nominate 
family members, trusted persons, or associates to be directors and auditors (Yeh and 
Woidtke, 2005), we also regard directors and auditors as important conduits for firms to 
get connected to the external environment. In total, we collected 2716 distinct names of 
business groups in 1998 and 3086 in 2004.  
With regard to party figures, we collected names of leaders of KMT and DPP from 
their websites (http://www.kmt.org.tw and http://www.dpp.org.tw) and proceedings of 
party conventions.  Specifically, we coded the names of KMT central committee 
members and regular central committee members. We also coded the names of DPP 
central standing committee members, central executive committee members, and central 
review committee members.  Moreover, we collected name lists of national and 
provincial administrators (i.e. ministers and vice-ministers of different ministries, 
directors and deputy-directors of departments one level lower than the ministries, and 
major officers in provincial government) from the website of the directory of the 
 57 
Taiwanese government (http://twinfo.ncl.edu.tw). In addition, we coded members of the 
national and provincial legislatures and judiciary, together with their party affiliations, 
from the website of the parliament (http://www.ly.gov.tw) and the website of the judicial 
institution, the Judicial Yuan (http://www.judicial.gov.tw). In total, we got 3725 distinct 
names of politicians in 1998 and 3905 in 2004.  
Furthermore, we referred to additional three major sources to identify the social 
relationships between business group leaders and political actors. First, we checked the 
Excellent Business Database System (EBDS) (http://ebds.anyan.com.tw), which covers 
more than 200 periodicals and newspapers published in Taiwan and provides full-text 
search. We then searched through the Wealth Magazine (‘Tsai Hsun’) database, which 
provides periodical reports on the interaction between large business groups and political 
actors in Taiwan. The breath and depth of the reports in this magazine is comparable to 
those of Fortune and Far Eastern Economic Review. In addition, we surveyed 
autobiographies of group founders, dissertations, and books that devoted to this to topic 
(e.g. Chen, 1994; Hsu, 1991). 
 
Coding scheme 
Based on the ways through which business leaders and political actors get connected 
in Taiwan, we differentiate two types of political ties: formal position interlocks and 
informal ties. We used different methods to code the two types of political ties. For the 
formal position interlocks, we cross-checked the name list of business group leaders with 
the name list of political actors. The number of overlaps between the two name lists 
indicates the number of formal political ties maintained by the business group.  
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Informal political ties are family and social relationships between group executives 
and political figures. We coded three types of informal ties that were prevalent in Taiwan: 
1) familial and marital ties, 2) close friendships and same-hometown relationships, and 3) 
trade associations and social club memberships.  
A business group has a family/intermarriage tie if one of its top managers or major 
shareholders has a tie of kinship or an intermarriage relationship with a political actor. 
For instance, Wang Yu-Chen, the top officer of Hwa Eng Wire & Cable Group, has an 
elder brother, Wang Yu-Yun, who used to be the mayor of Kaoshiung City and a member 
of KMT central committee. Hence, Hwa Eng Wire & Cable Group was coded as 
politically connected to KMT. Another example is Ho Tung Group, which got connected 
to the former chairman of KMT, Lien Chan, through the intermarriage between Lien 
Chan’s eldest daughter and the son of Ho Tung’s deputy chairman of the board, Chen 
Ching-Chung.   
         The second type of informal political ties emerges when the top managers or major 
shareholders of a business group are close friends of political actors or are from the same 
home town as political actors. An example is the long-established friendship between the 
major shareholder of Lin Yuan Group, Tsai Hung-Tu, and the President of Taiwan, Chen 
Shui-Bian. They were classmates at the Taiwan National University and have been close 
friends since then. Evergreen Group is connected to DPP because the President of 
Evergreen Group, Chang Rong-Fa, is from the same hometown as You Hsi-Kun, the 
former President of DPP.  
 Informal political ties can also be established when top managers or large 
shareholders of business groups have memberships in national trade associations and/or 
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prestigious social clubs. For example, China Rebar Group was politically connected to 
KMT since its President Wang You-Ceng was the chairman of the National Federation of 
Commerce, an important trade association through which KMT propagated and executed 
its economic policies when it was in power.  Another example is Chen Sheng-Tien, the 
top officer of Sampo group. He was a member of a prestigious golf club where business 
magnates and political leaders often gathered to play golf.  
When coding informal political ties, we first searched the names of the top 
executives and major shareholders of business groups in the databases and other archives. 
After reading through the descriptive information about interactions between group 
leaders and political figures, we coded informal political ties by ensuring that these ties 
potentially influence business groups through exchange of information and resources, 
and/or sharing of common political ideologies with connected political actors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
